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ANNULMENT UNDER THE WASHINGTON DIVORCE
ACT OF 1949
JOHN R. TOMLINSON

In the law of domestic relations, an anulment is to be distinguished
from a divorce, in that a divorce is the termination, dissolution or suspension of a previously existing valid marriage; usually for some cause
arising after the marriage, whereas an annulment is a court decree
proclaiming that an obstensibly legal marital relationship is stripped of
its color of legality, and declared void ab initio, for some reason existing
at the time of the marriage.'
The term "annulment" might also be distinguished from the term
"decree of nullity," which when properly used would indicate a court
order declaring the invalidity of a void marriage, whereas "annulment"
would be applicable only as to those marriages which are voidable.'
Unfortunately however, this distinction has seldom been made by the
legislature,' court,4 or attorneys' in the state of Washington but rather
1 KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 211 (3d. ed. 1946) ; Comment, 22 KAN. Crry
L. REV. 109, 110 (1954) ; McDonald v. McDonald, 6 Cal.2d 427, 58 P.2d 163 (1936);
Millar v. Millar, 175 Cal. 797, 806; 167 Pac. 394, 398 (1917).
2 The suggested distinction would have the merit of delineating between a judgment
declaring the non-existence of an alleged marriage and a judgment which destroys an
existing but voidable relationship.
3 "Decree of nullity" is used but twice in the divorce act of 1949. It is first used in
RCW 26.08.100 and then again in RCW 26.08.050. The latter statute reads as follows,
"In the case of a void marriage, either party may apply for, and on proof obtain, a
decree of nullity of marriage. . .

."

This statute has superseded REM. REV.

STAT.

§ 983

which utilized the phrase "decree of nullity" in much the same manner. It is suggested
that the use in RCW 26.08.050 of "decree of nullity" is directly traceable to REm.
REV. STAT. § 983 and that it was used more as a matter of convenience than from any
specific intent upon the part of the legislature to distinguish "decree of nullity" from
"annulment."
For an opinion to the contrary see Marsh, The Uniform Divorce Recognition Act:
Sections 20 and 21 of the Divorce Act of 1949, 24 WASH. L. REV. 259, 269 (1949),
where in speaking of RCW 26.08.060 he states, "That section seems to refer to voidable, not void, marriages; to annulment, not decree of nullity-concepts which are
clearly differentiated in other sections of the same act and elsewhere in the Washington
statutes."
Further evidence that the legislature has failed to differentiate between the terms
"annulment" and "decree of nullity" is presented upon examining those statutes in
which the legislature speaks in terms of annulment, yet they do not make clear whether
they are referring to the annulment of a voidable marriage, or the annulment of a
void marriage, or the annulment of both void and voidable marriages. For example
see: RCW 26.08.060, RCW 26.08.080, RCW 26.08.090, RCW 26.08.110, RCW 26.08.130,
RCW 26.08.140, RCW 26.08.150, RCW 26.08.170, and RCW 26.08.190.
4 The Washington court similarly has failed to recognize the suggested distinction
between "annulment" and "decree of nullity." See Harding v. Harding, 11 Wn.2d 138,
147; 118 P.2d 789, 793 (1941), where the court speaks of "decree of nullity" of a
voidable marriage. For examples of the court referring to "annulment" of void marriages see, e.g., Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213, 96 Pac. 1079 (1908) ; Beyerle v.
Bartsch, 111 Wash. 287, 190 Pac. 239 (1920) ; Barker v. Barker, 31 Wn.2d 506, 197
P.2d 439 (1948) ; Sortore v. Sortore, 70 Wash. 410, 126 Pac. 915 (1912) ; and Hahn
v. Hahn, 104 Wash. 227, 229; 176 Pac. 3, 4 (1918).
5 See the argument of counsel in cases cited note 4, supra. See also the argument
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the terms are commonly used interchangeably to signify the judicial
recognition of the invalidity of void as well as voidable marriages. Consequently, confusion as to the precise meaning of these terms often
results.
For a definition of the term void, the Washington court has paraphrased the common law and has held that the term void is to be used
as, "... a convenient label to designate any marriage which because of
the nature of the disability or impediment with which it is affected, is
regarded by common law or statute, as an absolute nullity, incapable of
ratification."'
As to the meaning of voidable, the Washington court again -follows
the common law interpretation and designates as voidable, ".. .any
marriage subject to a disability or impediment of such degree or nature
that the marriage is considered valid unless set aside by court decree,
and subject in some cases to ratification by the parties."'
The significance of this distinction between void and voidable marriages is forcefully demonstrated by the case of In re Hollingsworth's
Estate.8 There it was held that the marriage being voidable only, it is
valid until annulled and cannot be collaterally attacked nor impeached
after the death of one of the parties, but can only be attacked in a
direct proceeding during the lifetime of both spouses. However, if the
marriage had been found to be void, it would be a nullity with or without judicial decree and its validity could be impeached in any competent
court whether the question arises directly or collaterally and whether
the parties be living or dead.'
While it is generally conceded that a marriage void at its inception
does not require the decree of any court to restore the parties to their
original rights or to make the marriage void,"0 yet even as to these void
marriages a decree of nullity is often of the highest importance, both to
of the prosecuting attorney of King County in Saville v. Saville, 44 Wn2d 793, 271
P.2d 432 (1954).
61n re Romano's Estate, 40 Wn.2d 796, 803: 246 P.2d 501, 505 (1952) ; 1 BisHoP,
MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION, § 258 (1891); KEEZER, op. cit. supra, note 1,
§ 310; 2 SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND Doamsvxc RELATIONS, § 1081
(6th ed. 1921).
7In re Romano's Estate, supra, note 6. See 1 BisHoP, op. cit. supra, note 6, § 259
where it is stated that, "A marriage is voidable when for its constitution there is an
imperfection which can be inquired into only, during the lives of both of the parties,
in a proceeding to obtain a sentence declaring it null. Until set aside, it is practically
valid; when set aside, it is rendered void from the beginning."
8 145 Wash. 509, 261 Pac. 403 (1927).
02 SCHouLER, op. cit. supra, note 6; 1 BIsHoP, op. cit. supra, note 6; In re Gregorson's Estate, 160 Cal. 21, 116 Pac. 60 (1911).
10 Sortore v. Sortore, supra, note 4; State v. Yoder 113 Minn. 503, 130 N.W. 10

(1911).
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the individuals concerned and to the community, for then the issue of
the status of the parties, and their children is put at rest while the
parties are living and the evidence is still readily obtainable.11
Generally under early English law, whether a marriage was to be
considered void or voidable depended upon the nature of the impediment." The cannonical impediments,13 such as consanguinity, impotence, and affinity rendered the marriage voidable, whereas the civil
impediments,14 which included prior marriage and idiocy, and generally
coincided with the common law notions of capacity to contract, rendered the marriage void.
While the Washington law of domestic relations, as suggested earlier,
has essentially followed the early English authorities, yet certain variations from the decisions of these authorities have developed.
The principle statutes upon which the Washington court bases its
classification of marriages as either void or voidable, are RCW 26.04.020"s and RCW 26.04.030," which specify that certain marriages are
prohibited. However these statutes do not further designate whether
such prohibited marriages are to be considered as being void or voidable, and hence such determination is necessarily left to the discretion
of our court.
The Washington court in interpreting the meaning of the word prohibited, in this context, has determined in accord with the present general legislative tendency in the United States17 that those marriages
11 For Washington cases granting a decree recognizing the invalidity of void marriages see Knoll v. Knoll, 104 Wash. 110, 176 Pac. 22 (1918) ; Buckley v. Buckley,
supra, note 4; Hahn v. Hahn, supra, note 4; and Sortore v. Sortore, supra, note 4.
12 22 KAN. CITY L. REv., supra, note 1.
13 So named because they were the impediments primarily recognized by the English
Ecclesiastical courts under cannonical rules. See 1 BisHop, op. cit. supra, note 6, §§
262, 265.
14 So named because they were the impediments primarily recognized by the English
lay tribunals. See 1 BisHoP, op. cit. supra, note 6, § 265.
15 RCW 26.04.020 prohibits the following marriages: "(1) When either party
thereto has a wife or husband living at the time of the marriage. (2) When the parties
thereto are nearer of kin to each other than second cousins, whether of the whole or
half blood, computing by the rules of the civil law. (3) Marriage to one's father's
sister or brother, mother's sister or brother, son, daughter, sister, brother, son s son
or daughter, daughter's son or daughter, brother's son or daughter, or sister's son or
daughter."
16 RCW 26.04.030 provides that the following marriages shall be prohibited: "No
woman under the age of forty-five years, or man of any age, unless he marries a
woman over the age of forty-five years, either of whom is a common drunkard, habitual
criminal, epileptic, imbecile, feeble-minded person, idiot, or insane person or person
who has theretofore been afflicted with hereditary insanity, or who is afflicted with
pulmonary tuberculosis in its advanced stages, or any contagious venereal disease,
unless the female party to such marriage is over the age of forty-five years."
17 2 SCHOULER, op. cit. supra, note 6, § 1081, declares that, ". . . the legislative
tendency today is to make marriages voidable rather than void, wherever the impediment is such as might not have been known to both parties before marriage, and where
public policy does not rise superior to all considerations of private utility."
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which fall within the prohibitions of RCW 26.04.020"s shall be void, 9
whereas those marriages prohibited by RCW 26.04.0300 shall be construed as voidable. It should be noted, .that this interpretation of the
word prohibited, differs from the early English decisions, in that marriages within certain forbidden lines of consanguinity have been reclassified from voidable to void,2 1 and lack of capacity because of
insanity, or the like, is now construed as rendering the marriage voidable rather than void. 2
A further legislative enactment classifying marriages as voidable is
RCW 26.04.130 which specifies that when either party to a marriage
is incapable of consenting thereto for lack of legal age or a sufficient
understanding, or when the consent of either party is obtained by force
or fraud, then such marriage is voidable.
Prior to the enactment of the divorce act of 1949 an annulment could
be obtained in Washington for a voidable marriage.2 Whether such a
remedy is still available is the problem with which the remainder of this
discussion shall be concerned.
'sSupra, note 15.
1This includes thdse marriages within the forbidden line of consanguinity as specified by RCW 26.04.020. Note that 2 SCHOULER, op. cit. supra, note 6, § 1091 indicates
that at common law marriages within certain lines of consanguinity rendered the marriage voidable rather than void. However, as pointed out by 1 BisHop, op. cit. supra,
note 6, § 276, there was an exception to this principle, ". . . in those cases where the
marriage is considered as incestuous by the law of Christianity, and as against natural
law. And these exceptions relate to marriages in the direct lineal line of consanguinity,
and to those contracted between brothers and sisters; and the exceptions rest on the
ground that such marriages are against the laws of God, are immoral and destructive
of the purity and happiness of domestic life."
Bigamous marriages are uniformly held to be void by the Washington court. Cf.
Powers v. Powers, 117 Wash. 248, 200 Pac. 1080 (1921) ; Valentine v. Valentine, 31
Wn2d 650, 198 P2d 494 (1948) ; Beyerle v. Bartsch, supra, note 4.
20 Supra, note 16.
2
lJohnson v. Johnson, 57 Wash. 89, 106 Pac. 500 (1910) ; State v. Nakashima, 62
Wash. 686, 114 Pac. 894 (1911).
22 It has been the common law view since earliest times that insanity renders the
marriage void. KEEZER, op. cit. supra, note 1, § 212; 1 BIsHoP, op. cit. supra, note 6,
§ 285; In re Romano's Estate, 40 Wn2d 796, 246 P2d 501, 505 (1952) ; 76 A.L.R.
769 (1932). Hence in order for the marriage of an insane person to be held voidable
rather than void a legislative reclassification of such marriages must be deemed to
have taken place. That such a reclassification has taken place in Washington is indicated by In re Hollingworth's Estate, 145 Wash. 509, 261 Pac. 403 (1927), where it
was held that the marriage of a feeble minded person, prohibited by RCW 26.04.030,
"...the statute not providing that it shall be void, is voidable only, and cannot be
impeached after the death of one of the parties." See an interpretative analysis of the
Holling-worth opinion in 3 VAsH. L. Rnv. 57 (1928) where it is suggested that the
court in the Hollingworth case by so construing the statute has taken a position in
with the great weight of authority.
accord
23
In Waughop v. Waughop, 82 Wash. 69, 143 Pac. 444 (1914), the court granted
an annulment of a marriage, voidable because of the plaintiff's mental incompetency.
Cf. Arey v. Arey, 22 Wash. 261, 60 Pac. 724 (1900) in which the court granted the
annulment of a marriage, voidable because of the non-age of one of the parties at the
time of entering into the marriage relation.
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This problem has acquired significance largely because of the enactment in the divorce act of 1949 of RCW 26.08.040 and RCW 26.08.030, which grant specific advantages to one seeking an annulment or
decree of nullity, rather than a divorce.
The contrasting time requirements upon the bringing of an action for
annulment or decree of nullity as opposed to those requirements necessary to be met in order to bring an action for divorce, place a premium
upon the seeking of such annulment or decree of nullity in those situations in which time is of importance." While RCW 26.08.040 places
a limitation that no divorce can be tried nor any decree of divorce
entered therein until the complaint has been on file for ninety days
and until ninety days have elapsed from the date of service of summons
upon the defendant, yet no comparable limitation is placed upon the
procurement of an annulment or decree of nullity. Hence, an annulment
or decree of nullity is available notwithstanding the fact that the ninety
day waiting period required in order to bring an action for divorce is
not complied with.
It should also be noticed that Rem. Rev. Stat. § 984, which required
the plaintiff in an action for annulment or decree of nullity, to have
been a resident of the state for one year prior to filing his complaint,
has been superseded by RCW 26.08.030 which retains the one year
residency requirement as a prerequisite to the filing for divorce, but
eliminates it as a requirement to be fulfilled prior to the bringing of an
action for annulment or decree of nullity.
A further boon to one seeking an annulment was the enactment of
RCW 26.08.060 which provides for the legitimacy of those children
conceived or born during the existence of a marriage of record which
is later declared void and entitles such children to all the rights of
legitimate children notwithstanding the subsequent annulment of the
marriage. This statute substantially eliminates the threat of such
children being declared illegitimate and hence abrogates illegitimacy
as an obstacle to the obtaining of an annulment or decree of nullity."
24 For example, where the person seeking the annulment is a woman with child by
a man not her husband and she wishes to annul her present marriage and marry the
father of her unborn child so as to give this child the name of its natural father, it is
essential that she remarry prior to the birth of the child.
25 For a discussion of the common law policy which unjustly penalized the issue of
annulled marriages by declaring them illegitimate, see 1 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY
LAWS, § 48 (1931). See also a report on proposed changes in the divorce law of the
State of Washington given at the 1947 annual meeting of the Washington State Bar
Association and reported in 22 WASH. L. REV. 17, 19 (1947), indicating the need of a
statute legitimizing children born of a marriage which is subsequently annulled. In
this report it is said, "You would be amazed at the number of annulment cases in King
County for instance, which by the fact that they declare the marriage void of record,
by the same token make the children illegitimate."
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Suit costs and fees,2 6 support of children,27 authority of the court to
make disposition of the property of the parties," and alimony,29 are

further factors which need not be a hindrance to the pursuit of annulment or decree of nullity, in that by statute 0 they have become as
readily available in suits for annulment or decree of nullity as they are
in actions for divorce.
With this background securely in mind, the recent Washington decision of Saville v. Saville,3-' decided by Department 1 of the Supreme
Court of the State of Washington on July 1, 1954, properly can be
considered. This case concerned a wife's suit to annul a marriage upon
20 RCW 26.08.090 provides that pending an action for divorce or annulment the court
may make, and by attachment enforce, . . . such orders relative to the expenses of
such action, including attorney's fees, as will insure to the wife an efficient preparation
of her case and a fair and impartial trial thereof. Upon the entry of judgment in the
superior court, reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded either party, in addition to
statutory costs. Upon any appeal, -the supreme court may in its discretion award
reasonable attorney's fees to either party for services on the appeal, in addition to
statutory costs." For further statutory provisions granting the court discretion to
award suit costs and attorney's fees, in annulment actions see RCW 26.08.190, and
RCW 26.08.110. For case authority holding that the court in an action for annulment
has discretion to award such suit money and attorney's fees as it shall deem just, see
Arey v. Arey, 22 Wash. 261, 60 Pac. 724 (1900).
27 Washington statutes providing for the support and care of children are RCW
26.08.060, RCW 26.08.170, and RCW 26.08.110. Note that these statutes authorize the
court in annulment actions to make such order for the custody, care, maintenance,
education, and support of the minor children of the invalid marriage as may seem
necessary and proper, and that such orders are subject to modification as in actions
for divorce. Cases recognizing the authority of the court to make proper provision for
the care, custody and maintenance, of the minor child in a nullity proceeding, are
Peterson v. Peterson, 164 Wash. 573, 3 P.2d 1007 (1931) ; Barker v. Barker, 31 Wn.2d
506, 197 P2d 439 (1948) ; accord, Barett v. Barett, 210 Cal. 559, 292 Pac. 622 (1930).
28 RCW 26.08.110 gives the court authority in annulment actions to make, ". . . such
disposition of the property of the parties, either community or separate, as shall appear
just and equitable, having regard ta the respective merits of the parties, to the condition in which they will be left by such divorce or annulment, to the party through
whom the property was acquired, and to the burdens imposed upon it for the benefit of
the children, . .

."

See Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213, 96 Pac. 1079 (1908), and

Sortore v. Sortore, 70 Wash. 410, 126 Pac. 915 (1912), which support the authority
of the court to make disposition of the property of the parties.
29 See RCW 26.08.110 and RCW 26.08.090 which indicate that the right to alimony
is as clearly given, by the divorce act of 1949, in the case of annulment as it is in
divorce. 1 VERNIER, AmERCAN FAMLY LAWS, op. cit.-supra, note 25, § 53, indicates that
there is a split of authority upon the question of whether alimony should be granted
in annulment actions. However, he represents that alimony in annulment actions is
justified in that often the mere restoration of the parties to their former rights, existing
at the time of their marriage, would not guarantee justice to the parties. "Broadly
speaking, the same considerations may be present in marriages terminated by annulment as through divorce, and the same rights and remedies would seem to be applicable.
Therefore, it is not surprising to find, in connection with annulment actions, provisions
for temporary and permanent alimony, as well as for restitution and division of the
property of the parties."
3o The Washington statutes cited in notes 26, 27, 28, and 29 are typical examples of
the confusion which can result because of the failure of the legislature to use precise
terminology. Hence it is not clear whether the legislature, in using the term "annulment" in these statutes was referring to the annulment of a voidable marriage, the
annulment of a void marriage, or the annulment of both voidable and void marriages.
8 44 Wn2d 793, 271 P.2d 432 (1954).
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grounds that she was induced to enter into it by the fraudulent misrepresentations of her husband. The Superior Court of King County
entered a decree of annulment upon the default of the husband, and the
prosecuting attorney pursuant to the authority vested in him by RCW
26.08.080,"2 appealed to the Supreme Court."
There was no question but that the wife was induced to enter into the
marriage through the fraud of the defendant. However, it was the
appellant's contention that whatever jurisdiction the court formerly had
to annul voidable marriages was withdrawn by the divorce act of 1949,
and that only void marriages could now be annulled.
The court refused to accept fully the argument of the appellant, and
expressed no opinion as to his broad thesis that it was the legislative
intent that the remedy of annulment no longer was to be available in
cases where the marriage was voidable. Rather, the court narrowed the
decision to only those marriages described as voidable by RCW 26.04.130"' and for which the remedy of divorce is provided by RCW 26.08.020(1)." As to these marriages the court held that annulment no
longer is available and that divorce is now the exclusive remedy.
The prosecuting attorney based his contention that the courts of this
state no longer are authorized to annul voidable marriages, upon certain changes in the law accomplished by the divorce act of 1949, which
he advocated were indicative of the legislative intent. 8
These changes were the elimination of the one year residency requirement, previously necessary in order to obtain an annulment or decree
82 Which provides that, ". . . It shall be the duty of the prosecuting attorney to
appear upon the trial of every default or noncontested divorce or annulment case, and
in such other divorce cases as the presiding judge may direct, as a party to said action
and to advise the court, . . . The prosecuting attorney shall have the same right to
appeal as other parties to the action."
33 Upon the appeal counsel for respondent submitted no brief and the court refused
to allow him to make an oral argument. Therefore the court in the Saville case was
confronted with a decidedly one sided argument in favor of the appellant, with but
little indication in the appellant's brief of any possible case for the respondent.
34 RCW 26.04.130. "When either party to a marriage is incapable of consenting
thereto for want of legal age or a sufficient understanding, or when the consent of
either party is obtained by force or fraud, such marriage is voidable, but only at the
suit of the party laboring under the disability, or upon whom the force or fraud is
imposed."
3 RCW 26.08.020. "Divorce may be granted by the superior court on application
of the party injured for the following reasons: (1) When the consent to the marriage
of the party applying for the divorce was obtained by force or fraud, and there has
been no voluntary cohabitation after the discovery of the fraud, or when either party
shall be incapable of consenting thereto, for want of legal age or a sufficient understanding."
36 See a report of the Committee on Divorce Law, submitted at the 1948 annual
meeting of the Washington State Bar Association, in 23 WASH. L. REV. 320 (1948) ;
also an interpretative analysis of the divorce law of 1949, in 24 WASH. L. REv. 123
(1949).
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of nullity; the restatement of the first ground for divorce, RCW 26.08.020(1), formerly Rem. Rev. Stat. § 982(i), to include every ground
which is set forth in RCW 26.04.130 pertaining to voidable marriages;
and the repeal of Rem. Rev. Stat. § 983, and the enactment of RCW
26.08.050 in its place.
Regarding the elimination of the one year residency requirement in
actions for annulment or decree of nullity,87 the prosecuting attorney
apparently took the position that it was not within the contemplation
of the legislature when enacting the divorce act of 1949 to eliminate
this safeguard without also restricting the situations within which an
annulment would thereafter be available, and therefore annulments of
voidable marriages were to be barred.
Conceding that the argument of the prosecutor is of some merit, yet
it cannot fairly be said to be indicative of the legislative intent to preclude the remedy of annulment for voidable marriages." Rather this
elimination of the one year residency requirement as a condition
precedent to the procurement of an annulment could just as well be
taken as legislative recognition of a liberal policy encouraging the invalidation of all objectional marriages, including therein voidable as
well as void marriages."
Another of the changes urged by the prosecutor to be suggestive of
the legislative intent to withdraw the remedy of annulment for voidable
marriages is the restatement of the first ground for divorce, to include
See RCW 26.08.030 which supersedes R1m. REv. STAT. § 984.
As indicated in 23 WASH. L. Rv. 320 (1948), and 24 WAsH. L. REv. 123 (1949),
it apparently was the intent of the subcommittee of the State Bar's Legislative Committee to draft a bill that would no longer permit the annulment of voidable marriages.
A bill subsequently was drafted pursuant to the subcommittee's recommendations and
was submitted to the 1949 session of the Washington State Legislature, where it was
passed without substantial amendment. However, what the subcommittee of-the State
Bar Association intended to do and what actually was done are not necessarily identical.
For example in the report of the subcommittee of the state bar, reprinted in 23 WAsH.
L. REv. 320, 321 (1948), it is said that, "Section 8449 (now RCW 26.04.130) setting
forth the grounds for voidable marriages is also to be amended to conform with the
amendments to Section 983 to make the only grounds for annulment a void marriage, .. ." That REm. REv. STAT. § 8449 was not so amended becomes obvious upon
examination of RCW 26.03.130 which is the exact counterpart of section 8449. Note
that this statute has remained unchanged since it was originally enacted in 1881. See
87
8

CoDF of 1881 § 2381.
8 For a contrary opinion see 24 WAsH. L. REv. 123, 124 (1949), where it is said,

.. It was felt that the one-year residence requirement should not apply to actions
in which the relief sought is simply judicial recognition of the invalidity of a marriage. . . . Throughout the committee's study and drafting of the act of 1949, the
approach to annulments has been based on the belief that marriages should be held
valid except where the law declares that they are absolutely void, such as where
bigamy is proved." Hence it would appear that'the intent of the drafting committee
was to dispense with th6 one year residence requirement only as pertaining to actions
for a decree of nullity. However, here again what was intended to be done and what
actually was done are not identical.
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every ground which is set forth in RCW 26.04.130 relating to voidable
marriages.4 0
The Washington court refused to fully accept this argument of the
prosecutor. However upon such restatement of the first ground for
divorce it attached particular significance and held that such statutory
amendment is indicative of the legislative intent to make divorce the
exclusive remedy for those marriages described as voidable by RCW
26.04.130, and for which the remedy of divorce is prescribed by RCW
26.08.020 (1). '
The court in arriving at this decision, circumvented the fact that
Rem. Rev. Stat. § 8449 had not been repealed by the divorce act of
1949 but rather has remained the same as prior to the passage of the
1949 enactment, by reasoning that since RCW 26.04.130 (Rem. Rev.
Stat. § 8449) does not specify the remedy to be followed it is merely
definitive in effect." It is submitted however, that by so holding our
court apparently has overlooked a body of prior Washington case law
on this point.
The Washington court in strong dicta previously had stated that
Rem. Rev. Stat. § 8449"3 is a remedial statute. Perhaps the most recent
case discussing this point is In re Romano's Estate" where the court
in referring to In re Hollingworth's Estate,45 said, ".

.

. While RCW

26.04.130 relating to remedies, previously referred to, was part of
40 It should be noted that this change upon which the prosecutor has placed great
emphasis merely added the provision, ". . . or when either party shall be incapable of
consenting thereto, for want of legal age or a sufficient understanding," to the first
ground for divorce. Prior to the enactment of the divorce act of 1949 a dual remedy
of divorce annulment had been provided by REM. REV. STAT. § 8449, and by REM.
REv. STAT. § 982 (1), when the consent to the marriage of the party applying for the
divorce or annulment was obtained by force or fraud and there had been no voluntary
cohabitation after the discovery of the fraud. Hence since the Saville case concerned
a marriage induced by fraud and the injured party prior to the enactment of the
divorce act of 1949 had the dual remedy of either divorce or annulment, how can it now
be said that the plaintiff has only the single remedy of divorce when the portions of
both REM. REV. STAT. § 982 (RCW 26.08.020 (1)) and REM. REv. STAT. § 8449 (RCW
26.04.130) pertaining to fraud have not been altered. However this argument was
ignored by both the prosecuting attorney and the court in the Saville case.
41 Saville v. Saville, 144 Wash. Dec. 729, 732, 271 P.2d 432, 434 (1954). "In our
opinion, the effect of the 1949 enactment is to make divorce the exclusive remedy for
dissolving marriages which are voidable under RCW 26.04.130. The inclusion in the
amended form of RCW 26.08.020(1), setting out the first statutory ground for
divorce, of all the circumstances which render a marriage voidable under RCW
26.04.130, could have no other purpose." Note that the court ignores the argument as
to dual remedies of both divorce and annulment as set out in note 40.
42 Saville v. Saville, supra, note 41, "It may be noted that RCW 26.04.130, relating
to voidable marriages, does not specify the remedy to be followed. Hence, no question
of repeal by implication of RCW 26.04.130 is presented."

43 See RCW 26.04.130.
44 40 Wn.2d 796, 804; 246 P.2d 501, 506 (1952).
45 145 Wash. 509, 261 Pac. 403 (1927).
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the statute law of this state, the statute was not referred to and the
case was decided on the basis of common law principles.""
A host of other Washington cases similarly have emphatic dicta
bearing directly upon this issue which, even though dicta, should be
entitled to some weight as an indication of prior courts' views regarding
RCW 26.04.130 as a remedial statute." Although the court in these
cases denied the annulment sought either because the parties bringing
the action were improper parties under the statute4 8 or because of
failure of proof that the marriage was voidable, 9 the dicta is to the
4"The Romano case concerned a suit brought by the legatees under a will which
was purportedly revoked -by the subsequent marriage of the testator, now deceased.
These legatees seek to re-establish the will by having the marriage declared void as of
the date of the ceremony. Their attack on the marriage is based upon the mental incompetence of Romano at the time he entered into the marriage, and upon the fact
that the marriage was procured by fraud and duress practiced by the defendant.
Romano was never able to consummate the marriage, nor did he ever voluntarily
cohabit with the defendant. A short time thereafter Romano was judicially declared
incompetent and about two years later he died without regaining his sanity. One of
the reasons given by the court in holding for the defendant is that even though the
marriage was voidable, Romano's heirs were precluded from collaterally attacking it,
in that they were not parties, ". . . laboring under the disability, or upon whom the
force or fraud is imposed," as specified by RCW 26.04.130. This case is significant in
that even though the annulment is not allowed, yet the court in referring to RCW
26.04.130 treats it as a remedial statute.
47
I1 re Hollopeter, 52 Wash. 41, 100 Pac. 159 (1909); Harding v. Harding 11
Wn.2d 138, 118 P.2d 789 (1941); Cushman v. Cushman, 80 Wash. 615, 142 Pac. 26
; Tisdale v. Tisdale 121 Wash. 138, 209 Pac. 8 (1922).
(1914)
48
n re Hollopeter, supra, note 47; In re Romano's Estate, 40 Wn2d 796, 246 P2d
501 (1952). The Hollopeter case concerned an action brought by the parents of a
minor child to secure the annulment of the child. The court denied the annulment on
the basis that BAL. CODE § 4477 (RCW 26.04.130) allowed such actions only at the
suit of the party laboring under the disability or upon whom the force or fraud is
imposed.
40 Harding v. Harding, 11 Wn2d 138, 147; 118 P.2d 789, 793 (1941); Cushman v.
Cushman, supra, note 47; Tisdale v. Tisdale, supra, note 47. In the Harding opinion
the court recognized that RCW 26.04.130 relates to remedies and said, ".

.

. that,

under REm. REv. STAT. § 8449, facts might be shown justifying a court in annulling a
mariage for fraud, at the instance of the party upon whom the fraud was imposed, ..."
However the annulment was not allowed in that there was no evidence presented to
show that the failure to consummate the marriage by cohabitation was pursuant to
any intent formed prior to the marriage ceremony. Note that the court in Saville v.
Saville, 44 Wn.2d 793, 271 P.2d 432 (1954), took notice of the discussion in the
Harding opinion pertaining to REM. REv. STAT. § 8449, but characterized it as pure
dictum, and hence not entitled to appreciable weight in influencing their decision.
In the Cushman and Tisdale cases, the court while recognizing that REM. REV.
STAT. § 8449 was a remedial statute yet denied the annulment upon the ground that the
marriage was not voidable. The annulments were sought upon the basis that under the
provisions of RE?. REV. STAT. § 8449 the parties were incapacitated from contracting
a valid marriage because of want of "legal age." However the court held that by
"legal age" is meant the common law age of consent to marry of fourteen for males and
twelve for females and since in both cases the parties exceeded- this "legal" age the
marriages were not voidable and the annulments were denied. Note that under this
decision neither RCW 26.04.130 nor RCW 26.04.210, which prescribes the required age
necessary to obtain a marriage license and without parental consent, alter the rule
that in order for the marriage to be held voidable the parties must be under the
common law age of consent to marry.
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effect that if the parties were qualified for an annulment it would be
under the authority of RCW 26.04.130.
Arey v. Arey5 ° is another Washington decision apparently recognizing RCW 26.04.130 as a remedial statute. The case concerned an appeal
taken from the refusal of the lower court to award suit money and
attorney's fees in conjunction with an award of annulment of a voidable
marriage. Significantly the court cited Bal. Code § 4477, which is
identical to RCW 26.04.130, as authorizing the annulment. The judgment of the lower court as to the suit money and attorney's fees was
reversed, however, in all other respects its decision was affirmed. Hence,
the Supreme Court in effect ratified the lower decision granting the
annulment of the voidable marriage."
Therefore logic indicates that the inclusion in the amended form of
RCW 26.08.020(1), setting forth all the circumstances which render a
marriage voidable under RCW 26.04.130, could indeed have some other
purpose than to make divorce the exclusive remedy for such voidable
marriages. Rather, these statutes should be construed as providing a
dual remedy of either divorce or annulment, RCW 26.08.020(1)
authorizing divorce, and RCW 26.04.130 sanctioning annulment.
A final ground urged by the prosecuting attorney in Saville v. Saville5"
in support of the theory that the legislative intent in enacting the
divorce act of 1949 was to preclude the remedy of annulment for voidable marriages, was the repeal of Rem. Rev. Stat. § 983", and the
enactment of RCW 26.08.050"5 in its place.
In refutation of this argument it should be observed that the appli50 22 Wash. 261, 60 Pac. 724 (1900).
51 But see Cushman v. Cushman, 20 Wash. 615, 623, 142 Pac. 26, 28 (1914). The
court distinguished the Arey case upon the basis that, ". . . The only error there
assigned was the refusal of the lower court to award suit money and attorney's fees,
the appeal being taken from an order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint upon the
ground that it did not state facts sufficient to authorize such awards. The court did
not review the judgment of annulment, since no appeal was taken from the judgment
and no one was complaining of the finding of the lower court upon the dissolution of
the marriage." However it should be noted that the issue under consideration in the
Cushman case was whether the marriage was voidable, and the court was not concerned with determining the statutory authority under which the marriage, if voidable,
should be annulled. Hence the Arey case is still a valid example of the court applying
RCW 26.04.130 in a remedial manner.
52 As apparently was the case for marriages induced by fraud prior to the enactment
of the divorce act of 1949. See note 40.
53 145 Wash. Dec. 729, 732; 271 P.2d 432, 434 (1954).
54 REM. REV. STAT. § 983. "When there is any doubt as to the facts rendering a
marriage void, either party may apply for and on proof obtain a decree of nullity
of marriage."
55RCW 26.08.050. "In the case of a void marriage, either party may apply for, and
on proof obtain, a decree of nullity of marriage. Such complaint shall be filed in the
county in which plaintiff is a bonafide resident at the time of commencing such action."
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cation by our court of Rem. Rev. Stat. § 98356 has previously been
confined to only those marriages which were void rather than voidable,"
and that Rem. Rev. Stat. § 8449"8 was recognized as the appropriate
remedial statute for voidable marriages."' Therefore the repeal of Rem.
Rev. Stat. § 983 should logically have no effect on such voidable marriages. Furthermore the court expressly holds that they will not interpret RCW 26.08.050 in the manner urged by appellant in that marriages may be voidable for reasons other than those specified in RCW
26.04.130, and for such marriages the statute provides no remedy, for
example, those marriages which are voidable in that they are prohibited
by RCW 26.04.030."0
Therefore the court in Saville v. Saville,61 concludes that, ... Unless
all of the circumstances which render a marriage voidable under RCW
26.04.030 are included within the statutory grounds for divorce, annulment is the only remedy." However a question arises as to the statutory
authority authorizing the annulment of such voidable marriages. RCW
26.04.130 cannot provide the requisite authority in that the court states
that it is not a remedial statute, nor is RCW 26.08.050 applicable in
that by its terms it applies to void marriages only. Hence the court has
placed itself in a dilemma where in order to support its decision in
Saville v. Saville,62 it must hold that RCW 26.04.130 is not remedial
in those situations where the parties to the voidable marriages are
qualified for a divorce under RCW 26.08.020(1), but is remedial in
those cases where the marriage is voidable by virtue of RCW 26.04.030.
Whether such a construction of RCW 26.04.130 actually is in accord
with the legislative intent is extremely doubtful.
However, until the Saville6" case is overruled by subsequent case
authority, or until there is a legislative amendment to the divorce act of
1949, the only remedy for those marriages which are voidable under
the authority of RCW 26.04.130 and also are included within the pur6 REm. REv. STAT. § 983 until amended by the divorce act of 1949 had remained
unchanged since its original enactment in 1881. See CODE of 1881 § 2001.
57 Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213, 96 Pac. 1079 (1908) ; Sortore v. Sortore, 70
Wash. 410, 126 Pac. 915 (1912) ; Hahn v. Hahn, 104 Wash. 227, 176 Pac. 3 (1918) ;
Beyerle v. Bartsch, 111 Wash. 287, 190 Pac. 239 (1920) ; and Barker v. Barker, 31
Wn.2d 506, 197 P.2d 439 (1948).
58 See RCW 26.04.130.
5
22,

supra; In re Romano's Estate, 40 Wn.2d 796, 246 P.2d 501
9 Cases cited note
(1952) ; and Arey v. Arey, 22 Wash. 261, 60 Pac. 724 (1900).
6o RCW 26.04.030, supra, note 16.
61145 Wash. Dec. 729, 732; 271 P.2d 432, 434 (1954).
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
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view of RCW 26.08.020(1) is divorce.64 But as to those marriages
which are voidable and are not included within RCW 26.08.020(1),
such as marriages prohibited by RCW 26.04.030, the remedy of annul-

ment apparently is still available, even though the statutory authority
authorizing such an annulment remains in doubt.

64 Note that the further problem is presented as to the degree of fraud necessary
before the court will allow the divorce under RCW 26.08.020(1). While there are no
Washington cases squarely in point, the general rule appears to be that the fraud in
order to be actionable must go to the essence of the marriage contract, such as an
intent formed prior to the marriage to deny the prospective spouse his conjugal rights.
See Harding v. Harding 11 Wn.2d 138, 118 P.2d 789 (1941). Hence the fraudulent
misrepresentations of one party as to birth, social position, fortune, temperament, love
and affection cannot vitiate a marriage contract. See Bolmer v. Edsall, 90 N.J. Eq.
299, 106 Atl. 646 (1919); Anders v. Anders, 224 Mass. 438, 113 N.E. 203 (1916);
Millar v. Millar, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394 (1917) ; Baird v. Baird, 125 Mont. 122,
232 P.2d 348 (1951) ; Bragg v. Bragg, 219 Cal. 715, 28 P.2d 1046 (1934).
The recent case of Rosender v. Rosender, 276 P.2d 338, 341 (Kan., 1954) seems to
extend the doctrine that the fraud to be actionable must go to the essence of the
marriage contract. The court in dictum said, ". . . one induced by fraudulent concealment to marry an epileptic, forbidden by the mentioned statute to marry, is entitled
to a divorce on the ground of fraudulent contract. The fraud which makes the contract
of marriage fraudulent is a fraud in law and upon the law. Such a fraud is accomplished
whenever a person enters into this contract knowing that he is an epileptic, yet in
order to induce the marriage, designedly and deceitfully conceals that fact from the
other party who is ignorant of it and has no reason to suppose it to exist." However,
the court denied the divorce because of the failure of the plaintiff to sustain the burden
of proving the facts necessary to constitute the fraudulent contract.
It should be noted that RCW 26.04.030 and KAN. G. S. 1949, 23-120, similarly
prohibit the marriage of an epileptic, and also that RCW 26.04.210 and KAN. G. S.
1949, 23-21, both require that the parties upon applying for a marriage license make
an affidavit that they are not afflicted with epilepsy. Hence the dictum in the Rosender
case becomes significant in that it suggests that the remedy of divorce may be available
under RCW 26.08.020(1) to those marriages which are prohibited under RCW 26.04.030, (at least to the marriage of an epileptic) upon the ground of fraudulent contract.
However whether the Washington court would wish to so extend the general rule
that the fraud to be actionable must go to the essence of the marriage contract is subject
to serious doubt by virtue of the holding in the Saville case.

